Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels
of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms,
and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it.
(Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than
man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on
other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter
how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience
at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism.
There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there
may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism.
But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and
only if there is something that it is to be that organism—something it is like
for the organism.
[…] Let me first try to state the issue somewhat more fully than by referring to the relation between the subjective and the objective, or between the pour-soi and the en-soi. This is far from easy. Facts about what it is like to be an X are very peculiar, so peculiar that some may be inclined to doubt their reality, or the significance of claims about them. To illustrate the connection between subjectivity and a point of view, and to make evident the importance of subjective features, it will help to explore the matter in relation to an example that brings out clearly the divergence between the two types of conception, subjective and objective.
I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are mammals, and there is no more doubt that they have experience than that mice or pigeons or whales have experience. I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species). Even without the benefit of philosophical reflection, anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally alien form of life.
THOMAS NAGEL Excerpts From The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974): 435-50.